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INSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN AN 
AGE OF ACADEMIC-INDUSTRY ALLIANCES 
MICHAEL J. MALINOWSKI, JD* 
INTRODUCTION 
This is an extraordinary time for life science and health care. Never has so 
much research in science been applied commercially, and never have so many 
human clinical trials been undef\Vay and offered so much promise for improving 
human health. 1 · Consequentially, never have the economic and regulatory 
challenges been as great. 2 
* Associate Professor of Law,·Health Law Institute, Widener University School of Law. 
J.D. Yale Law School 1991� B.S., st1mmaa1m la11dt, Tufts University 1987. The author would like to 
acknowledge the invaluable editorial contributiom; of Kristy Olivo and administrative assistance of 
Lena Mooney. 
1. S tt in.fro notes 3-7 and accompanying text Set gtntrt1J& NA T'LACAD. OF SCIENCES, INST. 
OF MED., EXTENDING MBDICARE REIMBURSEMENT IN CLINICAL TRIALS (Henry J. Aaron & Hellen 
Gelband eds., 2000) (hereinafter MEDICARE REIMBURSEMENT IN CLINICAL TRIALS), available at 
http://www.nap.equ/index.html; PHRMA, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRYPROFJLE 2000 v 
(2000) (hereinafter PHRMA INDUSTRY ,pROFILEJ, al http:/ /www.phrma.org/publications/ 
publicatiom1/profileOO/PhRMA_ ExecSum .. pdf. According to Ernst & Young, more than 280 
biotech products Are in advanced .clinical trials. ERNST & YOUNG, CONVERGENCE: THE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY INbUSTRY R.EPORT44 (2000). For identification of the drug development 
pipeline, see http://www.phrltla.otg Oast vi'lited Aug. 23, 2001) (site of the Pharmaceutical 
Researcher and Manufacturers <of America (PhRMA), the leading pharmaceutical trade 
organization); http://www.bio.org (last visited Aug� 23, 2001) (site of the Biotechnology Industry 
Organization (BIO), the leading biotechnology ·industry trade organization); http://www. 
clincaltrials.gov (last visited Aug. 23, 2001) (details on approximately 5,500 mostly govemment­
funded clinical trials); http://cancertrials.nci.nih.gov (last visited Aug; 23, 2001) (the National 
Cancer Institute's clinical trial listing)� http://actis.org (last visited Aug. 23, 2001) (the AIDS clinical 
trials information service (ACflS)); http://www.centerwatch.com (last visited Aug. 23, 2001) (one 
of the earliest and the mosU:omprehensive private sites focusing on clinical trials); http:// 
www.emergingmed.com (last visited Aug 23, 2001) (privately-fonded cancer trials under expansion 
to cover other diseases); http:/ /www.veritasmedicine.com (last visited Aug. 23, 2001) (lists trials and 
standard treatments for numeroull diseia.<;es); http:/ /www.americasdoctor.com/ clintrials/ main.cfm 
(trials in seven disease categories, excluding cancer); and http:/ /www.acurian.com/patient (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2001) (developing lists of trials iri various disease categories). 
2. Set Michael J. Malinowski, FDA Rlf.11/alio11 of BiotedJ11ology Protbltts far H11man Use, in 1 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHlcAL, LE.GAL, AND POLICY ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 215, 223-25 
(fhotna.-; J. Murray & Maxwell J. Mehlman eds. 2000) (hereinafter FDA Reg11/ation]; Michael J. 
Malinowski, Biot«hnolog i11 tht USA: Rupotiiive &g11/ation in the Lift Sci1nr1 lntblslry, 2 INT'L J. 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 16, 17 (2000) (hereinafter Biol1th110logy in lht l.!SAJ. See 1.enera/fy MICHAEL J. 
MALINOWSKI, BIOTECHNOLOGY: LAW, BUSINESS AND REGULATION § 9.05 (1999 & Supp. 2001 ). 
(hereinafter BIOTECHNOLOGY]. 
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Biotechnology has become a driving force in life science and increasingly in 
health care.3 The now maturing biotechnology sector has infused immense 
innovation and capital into life science research and development (R&D).4 Also, 
the pharmaceutical industry has been allocating a rising percentage ofits revenues 
to .research, from 11 percent to 20.3 percent over the last twenty years.5 The 
3. Con�ider that during the time frame for standard dntg development (8-n years) we have 
witnessed the emergence of biotechnology as a global i.11dustry and themarket introduction of 
nearly 100 drugs devdoped with thii; technology. See !/ntraf!y CYNTHiA RoBBINS�ROTH, FROM 
ALCHEMY TO IPO: THE BUSINESS OP BIOTECHNOLOGY ix'(2000); Biotechnology Industry Organization 
(BIO) at http://www.bio.org Qast visited Aug. 23, 2001) (the world's foremost biotech trade 
organization, identifying market approved drugs devdoped with the use of biotechnology). 
Nevertheless, the technology associated with contemporary biotechnology-meaning biotechnology 
undertaken in the era of the Human Genome Project (HGP)-we have seen applied thus far, and 
the impact of this technology on acaden!_ia, industry,the'.health care establishment, and people's 
lives merely marks the beginning ofa profound transition in both research and health care. S11 
RICHARD W. OLIVER; THE COMING BIOTECH AGE: 'IHE BUSINESS OF BIO-MATERIALS (2000) 
(discussing the broad human health and economic impact of advances in human genetics and 
biotechnology). S11 also Juan Enriquez & Ray A. Goldberg;Tran.yimmngLJ.fo, Traniforming B11siness: 
The LJ.fo-Scienn &volNtion, HARV. Bus. REv. 96, 97 {2000) (predicting a convergence among 
traditionally distinct sectors into life science). Drug development and medicine are moving into an 
era of unprecedented precision, most notably through the coupling of biology and information 
technology (bioinformatics) to identify gene expression, including subtle genetic differences known 
as single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNIPS) which are associated with the responsiveness of 
individuals to pharmaceuticals (both positive and adverse,reactions). See Michael J. Malinowski, 
S eparatint, Proficlive Gtnelic Testing from Snake Oil: fut.11/ation, Liabilitiu, and Lost Opportunities, 41 
J URJMETRICS 23, 31-33 & app. (2000) (hereinafter Snake Oi4 (identifying enabling technologies and 
emerging scientific disciplines). Sn also Sharon Begley,Matk-to-Ortler Medicine, NEWSWEEK, June 25, 
2001, at 64; Brad Stone, Wanted: Hot Industry S11k.s S.tpergttk.r;NEWSWEEK, Apr. 30, 2001, at 54, 55 
(discussing initiatives in bioinformatics by major universities and �'computer-industry giants" such 
as Compaq, IBM, and Oracle). ·�Increasingly, the medical Community is debating when rather than 
whether one's DNA will enable health care providers to assess susceptibility to common diseases, 
improve preventive care, and predict reactions to medications and other treatments." Snake Oil, 
sll}Jra, at 31. In fact, instances of genetic profiling for drug delivery already have reached the market. 
For example, breast cancer patients are tested for over expression of Her'-2-neu to determine 
whether they are candidates for Herceptin, and Visible Genetics, Inc. is marketing a test that helps 
doctors choose among the 15 or so drugs available to treat individual patients for AIDS. Id at 26 
n.12, 31-32 n.31; Andrew Pollack, When Gene Sequencing Becomes a Fact of Lift, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 
2001, at C1. 
4. Jeffrey Krasner, Biotech lashes In, BOSTON GLOBE, June 27, 2001, at C1. The tools of 
biotechnology have integrated the biotechnology and pharmaceutical sectors and are causing a 
convergence of many traditionally distinct industry sectors. Seegeneral/JERNST& YOUNG,stpranote 
1; Enriquez & Goldberg, s.tpra note 3. 
5. PHRMA INDUSTRY PROFILE, SlljJm note 1, at 20. S,, Ronald Rosenberg, Data Bottkneck 
Slmvint. Dr11g Discovery, BOSTON GLOBE, June 20, 2001, at 04. According to PHRMA, over the last 
decade the average cost of discovering and developing a single drug climbed from $300 million to 
$500 million, with some estimates reaching $800 million. S11 PHRM;\ INDUSTRY PROFILE, slljJra 
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industry's investment in R&D was $26.4 billion in the year 2000 and is estimated 
to reach $30 billion this year, compared to only $2 billion a decade ago.'' 
Government investment in biomedical research is also at an all-time high and 
rising.7 
For better and for worse, biotechnology has fundamentally changed the 
culture of research through the integration of academia and industry, and by 
placing intense focus on commercial application. 8 The environment for drug 
note 1, at vi; PHRMA, A MONTHLY REPORT PROM AMERICA'S PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES 
(Mar. 2001), at http:/ /www.phrma.otg (last vi.'lited Aug. 23, 2001). 'I1ili increased invesrmcnt in 
R&D reflects the fact that the phannaceutical industry, after decade.-i of 11olid profitability, now must 
overcome some Herculean challengei1 to meet shareholder expectations. SH FDA "Rlgillalio11, ntpnt 
note 2, at 224-225, (addressing the chall�s faced by pharmaceutical devclopen; in the new 
millennium). For example, many of the industry's most profitable pharmaceuticals have gone off 
patent and many more patents will expire over the next few years. Also, drug pricin� is being 
challenged domestically and globally (e.g., the dispute over African nations' access to AIDS 
pharmaceuticals), and patient markets are fracturing through advances in human genetics which arc 
raising precision in drug development signifiaintly and splintering traditional disease classifications 
through genetic profiling. Id Stt !!llmJ/!J CTR. FOR INT'!. DEV. AT HARVARD UNIV., GLOBAi. 
GOVERNANCE OF TECHNOLOGY: MEETING Tirn NF.EDS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIF$,SYN'l1 ms1s 
REPORT Qune 2001), al http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidbiotech/globalgovconf/rcport_ 
abstract.htm Qast visited Aug. 23, 2001);Jeffrey D. Sachs, Balms for the Poor, Tm� ECONOMl�-r. Aug. 
14, 1999; BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, THE PHARMACEtrn<:AI. INDUSTRY INTO ITS SECOND 
CENTURY: FROM SERENDIPl1YTO STRATEGY (Jan. 1999). Today, there arc: approximately 3,000 
drugs on the market that act against <,tiseascs associated with approximately 483 drug tar�ts. 
Rosenberg, s11/mr, PHRMA INDUSTRY PROFILE, supra note t. In contrast, through fields such as 
genomics, proteomics, and bioinfonnaticii, the pharmaceutical industry anticipate:! identifying 3,000 
to 10,000 targeti; over the next seveml years. Stt PHRM.A INDUSTRY PROFILE, sllfJra note: t, at v. 
Stt also Rosenberg, ntprtr, S11alu Oi4 sllfJra note 3, at 32-33 & app. (discussing the impact of genetic 
profiling on drug development and identifying related science disciplines and technol�es). Stt 
gtntralg ROBBINS-ROTH, slljJra note 3 (addre11sing how utilization of combinatori2.I chemistry, 
microarrays, laboratory automation and bioinformatics are increasing processing and identification 
of drug targets exponentially). Automated "high-throughput" equipment is enabling researchers 
to test thousands of potential drug andidates simultaneously. Stt PHRMA INDUSTRY PROFILE, 
supra note 1; S nalet Oi4 Sll/Jl'll note 3, at 32-33 & app. (discussing the impact of genetic profiling on 
drug development and identifying related mence disciplines and technologies). 
6. PHRMA INDUSTRY PROFILE, slljJl'll note 1, at 20-21. 
7. Stt INST. OF MED., FUNDING HEALTI-i SCIEN<:F.S RESEARCH 32 (1990). The Nat'J. 
Institutes of Health budget, which reached $17.8 billion in 1999, has more than doubled over the 
last lOycars. Su National Institutes of Health, a/http://www.nih.gov/about/ almanacs/index.html 
Qast visited Aug. 23, 2001 ). Moreover, in fiscal Year 1999, Congress and the Clinton Administration 
"produced a commitment to double the funding for NIH by 2003." NAT'L INST. OF HF.Al.TI!, 
INVESTMENTS, PROGRF.SS, & PLANS: SELECTED EXAMPLES FROM FY 1999-2003, at 
http://www.nih.gov/about/investments.htm Qast visited Aug. 23, 2001). 
8. Sttgt11tr"'!J U.S. GEN.ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TEC:HNOLOGY'I'llANSFER: ADMIN. Ol'THE 
BAYH-DOLE ACT BY RESEARCH UNIVERSmF.s, GAO/RCED-98-126 (May 1998) (hereinafter 
GAO REPORTJ, availabk at http:/ /www.access.gpo.gov; Peter S. Arno & Michael H Davis, W'?Y 
50 Widener I.Aw Symposium Journal [Vol. 8:47 
development has become a complicated, dynamic entanglement of alliances, 
corporate partnerships, and licensing and service agreements among biotech 
companies, pharmaceutical companies, academic mstitutions, and contract service 
providers.9 With the maturation of science associated with hundreds of 
biotechnology companies established in the United States in the late 1980s and 
early 1 Q90s, .this environment of intense collaboration, competition, and 
commercialization is moving into the clinic.10 · 
This article focuses .on the linpact of biotechnology and the genetics 
revolution on clinical research, and the resulting issue of institutional conflicts of 
interest. A major premise is that the issµ� of conflicts of interest transcends and 
requires reforms to the regulatory regimes for both technology transfer and 
human subject protections. Patt! addresses the integration of academia and 
industry in biomedical research; which has;;given rise to a proliferation of 
conflicts ofinterest Part II explores how this integration and the wave of 
resultinginhovationin life·saence.R&D is carrying forward from basic research 
into clinical research, and how the distiriction between clinical research and 
clinical care is beillg muddle�. Part III id�nti$es the regulatory challenges faced 
by tescarch iristiniijons and tlie entities reguI,ting them in this (!ra of acaclemia­
industry integration. The disW,ssion attributes the issue of potentially pervasive 
conflicts.of intere�t to weaknesses in the underlying regulatory regimes for federal 
technology transfer and human subject protections. Part IV introduces proposals 
for reform. 
Don't Wt Enforn ExiJling D1111, Pria Controls? Tht Unnro1.ni� and Untlijorrtd &a.ronablt Pricing 
R.tqllinmtnts Impos1d Upon PatmJs Dtri.ing in Wholt or in Pmt from Ftdtraf!y F1mrkd R.tstarrh, 75 TUL. L. 
·REV. 631 (2001 ); David Blumenthal et al.,Partiapation ofLJft-S dtna Fa"'l!J in Rmarrh &lationships with 
Int!Nstry, 335 NEw ENG. J. MED. J 734 (1996); John M. Golden, BioltchnololJ, TtchnololJ Poliry, and 
Pat1ntabili!J: Na/'llra/ Prodtids and lnvtnlion in tht A/lltri((llf Sys/1111, 50 EMORY L. J. 101, 120 (2001 ); Arri 
Kaur full, fut.11/ating Satnli.ftt Rmarrh: In1Jltd11al Proptrty Rit.hts and tht Nof111s of Sama, 94 Nw. U.L. 
REV. 77 (1999) [hereinafter '&1.11latingSti1nti.ftt &starrh]; Peter D. Blumberg, Comment, From ''Publish 
or Perish" lo �'Profit or Ptrish'�· Rntn11t.t From Uniumi!J Ttchnology Transftr and tht §501 (c)(3) Tax 
Ex1mption, 145, U. PA. L REV. 89 (1996); Lisa Piercey/'Ttthliolog Transftr Gm Proftssional, 
BIOVENTUREVIEW,Dec.1998,at 9;Eya1Press &JenniferWashbum, ThtKtpt UniVll'.rity,ATLAN'nC 
MONTHLY, Mar. 2000, at 39. According to a recent study, 28% of life sciences faculty received 
private sponsor funding, 15% held equity in the private sponsor, 33%. were engaged in paid 
consulting arrangements, and 32% held board positions. S1i Elizabeth A. Boyd & Lisa A. Bero, 
Assis.ting Fa"'f!J Finantial&lationships With Indtistry: A Ctu1 S flltfy, 284 JAMA· 2209, 2209-10 (2000). 
9. St1 ERNST & YOUNG,siipmnote 1, at 48-49. S•gintral/Jillptonote 8 and accompanying 
text; Michael J. Malinowski & Maureen A. O'Rourke, A FalstS/arl? Tht Impact of Federal Poliry on /ht 
Gtnoltthnology lndtistry, 13 YALEj.ON REG. 163, 180-88 (1996)> • · ·. · ! 
· 10. Stt sources cited sll}ra note l, Stt also PHRMA, 2000 SUR�EY: NEW MEDICINES IN 
DEVELOPMENT: BIOTECHNOLOGY, at http:/ /www.phmla;org/ searchc\ires/ newmeds/ Qast visited 
Aug. 23, 2001). 
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I. AN ERA OF ACADEMIC-lNDUSTilY ALLIANCES 
The United States' accomplishments in advancing biotechnology and its 
commercialization rest upon an aggressive federal technology transfer policy 
implemented through legislation enacted in the 1980s and early 1990s.11 The 
policy has been enormously effective in its goal of applying federally-funded 
research.12 The methodology is to grant clear title to inventions arising from 
government-sponsored research to institutions, and to reduce funding agency 
rights to a nontransferable, nonexclusive government license for non-commercial 
use. n Reflective of the intent behind the legislation and the stipulation that 
institutions exercising their options under Bayh-Dole pursue commercial 
development, many leading research universities approach technology transfer 
as the means to develop and apply research that otherwise might be delegated to 
filing cabinets.14 Technology transfer also generates significant revenue streams 
11. 1bis legislation consists of The Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (1994). The 
legislation to implement the Bayh-Dole Act consists of the Stevenson-Wydler Technology 
Innovation Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3717 (1994); Exec. Order No. 12591 52 Fed. Reg. 
13,414 (Apr. 22, 1987); American Technology Preeminence Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-245, 106 
Stat. 7 (codified in :>cattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); National Technology Transfer 
and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113, 110 Stat. 775 (codified in scattered sections 
of 15 U.S.C.). This federal technology transfer policy was complemented by several other areas of 
policy enacted lockstep with the development and needs of the biotechnology industry, including 
the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 Qunc 26, 1986) 
(issued by the Office of Science and Technology Policy under the Reagan Administration); ( >rphan 
D rug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-360ee; 26 
U.S.C. § 45C (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 236 (1994)); Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act 
of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); and the 
Reauthorization of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992C'PDUFA11"), Pub. L. No. 102-
571, 106 Stat. 4491 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). The orchestration of these policies 
and their effectiveness is addressed in Biottth11ohgy in the USA, .utpra note 2, at 17-18. For a technical 
law treatment, see BIOTECHNOLOGY, .rttpra note 2, at ch. 8. 
12. Stt!,tntral!JGAO REPORT, slljJranote 8, at 2. The number of academic patents has risen 
from approximately 250 annually in the early 1970's to more than 3,100 in 1998. Stt NAT'LSCI. Bo., 
SCIENCE& ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2000, 6-4 (2001 ), at http://www.nsf.gov/ sbe/ srs/ seindOO/ 
intro.htm. According to the Association of UniversityTechnology Managers (AUTM), a nonprofit 
organization of professionals involved in the management of intellectual property and licensing, 
1998 filings exceeded 4800. See Mildred K. Cho et al., Policies on Fat11l!J Conflicts ojlntmst at US 
Univmitie�. 284 JAMA 2203, 2203 (2000). Stt also Ass 'N UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, INC., AUTM 
LICENSING SURVEY: FY 1999 10-12 (2000) [hereinafter AUTM SURVEY), f11Jai/ablt al http:// 
www.autm.net./surveys/99/survey99A.pdf Qast visited Aug. 14, 2001). 
13. GAO REPORT,slljJranote 8, at 2 (referring to a section of a letter from Senator Orrin G. 
Hatch and Representative Henry Hyde). 
14. Id. For examele, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.I.T.) has incorporated 
this position into it.� mission statement. Set MASSACHUSETI'S INST. OF TECH., TECHNOLOGY 
LICENSING OFFICE MISSION STATEMENT, fllJailabk at http://web.mit.edu/afs/ athena.mit.edu/ 
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to cover administrative costs and to advance subsequent research.15 Moreover, 
resulting collaborations can be the means for researchers to access p�opriet_ary 
research tools and enabling technologies essential for contemporary biomedical 
research including voluminous deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) libraries, databases, 
and the bioinformatics capabilities to use these technologies.16 
The federal technology transfer legislation enacted by Congress mandates an 
impact assessment every five years, the last of which w�s completed via a_ Report 
to Congressional Committees issued by the General Accountlng Office (GAO) in May 
1998.17 The GAO report documents that Bayh-Dole is accomplishing its primary 
objective: much more academic research is being a�plied, especially w�en 
measured by the increase in patent filings and the establishment and expansion 
of university technology transfer operations.18 This conclusion is substantiated 
further by more recent data provided by the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPT0)19 and observations about the intensity of ongoing university 
technology transfer undertakings by the nation,s leading research universities.20 
In fact, through a study released in August 2001, the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) responded to proposals that more conditions be placed on its 
biomedical research funding.21 The NIH warned that recouping commercial 
org/ t/ tlo/ WWW/ mission.html. 
l 5. Some renowned institutions. including M.I.T.. also generate significant revenue:; by 
offering personalized technology transfer services to pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies 
for an annual fee that may reach tens of thousands of dollars per company. Stt MASSACHUSETTS 
INST. OF TECH., TECHNOLOGY LICENSING OFFICE: FURTHER INFORMATION, al http:// 
web.mit.edu/afs/athena.mit.edu/org/t/tlo/www/moreinfo.html Qast visited Sept. 12, 2001). 
16. One of the most noteworthy collaborations is the functional genomics initiative 
undertaken by the Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research, Millennium Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
Affymetrics, Inc. and Bristol Myers Squibb. Stt Press Release, Whitehead Institute for Biomedical 
Research, ''SOMs" Help Ana!Jz! Tho11sandt of Gtnes (Mar. 12, 1999), 11/ http://www.whitehead. 
mit.cdu/nap/1999/nap_preiis_99.html Qa.'\t visited Aug. 23. 2001). 
17. Sttgentral!J, GAO REPORT, sllfJra note 8. 
18. Sempra note 12. Sttgtwtra/&GAO REPORT, s�note 8, at 2 (relying heavily upon data 
compiled by AUTM). 
19. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) reports that biotechnology is 
one of the areas leading the 12.3% growth of utility, plant, and reissue (UPR) patent applications 
in fiscal year 2000. United States Patent & Trademark Office, An111111/ &ports: 2000 A11n11al &port, 
ovailabfeathttp:/ /www.uspto.gov/web/ offices/com/annual/index.html Qast visited Nov. 1,2001). 
The US PTO has added over 800 examiners since 1999 and anticipates another 12% increase in U PR 
filings for fiscal year 2001. Id; United States Patent & Trademark Office. An1111al Rrports: 1999 
Ann1111/&port, 1111ailablt a/http://www.uspto.gov/web/office11/com/anual/index.html Qast visited 
Nov. 1,2001). 
20. S tt Press & Washburn, slljJra note 8, at 46; Piercey, slljJra note 8. Set gt11eralfy mpra note 8; 
AUTM SURVEY, 1upra note 12. 
21. Sttgtntral!JDEP'THEALlll&HUMANSERVS.,NAT'LINST.OFHEALTH,NIHRESPONSE 
TO THE CONFER ENCE REPORT REQUEST FOR A P LAN TO ENSURE TAXPAYERS' INTERESTS ARE 
PROTECTED (July 2001) (hereinafter NIH RESPONSE], OlltJilab/1 al http://www.nih.gov/new-s/ 
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profits through royalty payments might discourage extensive research funded 
jointly by government and industry.22 
II. THE METAMORPHOSIS OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 
The cultural changes in academia and concerns about conflicts of interest 
associated with academic-industry integration in basic research23 now have 
reached the clinic. With the maturation of the Human Genome Project (HGP) 
and associated biomedical science, the integration of academia and industry has 
carried forward into clinical research at the same time that clinical research is 
being integrated with patient care.2"' Given a generation of breakthrough 
pharmaceuticals in R&D, the standard of care for many conditions is arguably in 
Phase III and even Phase II clinical trials.25 Increasingly, this is the public's 
perception. Influenced by the promise of genetic medicine and accomplishments 
such as the introduction of drugs such as Avonex for multiple sclerosis26 and 
070101wyden.htm. Stt also Anthony Shadid, A US Sharr of &yaltirs on '&starch is Oppostd· NIH 
Report Warns of FoCNs on Profit, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 22, 2001, at Al. As concluded by NIH, 
"(r)equiring direct financial recoupment of the federal investment in biomedical research can 
potentially impede the development of promising technologies by causing industry to be unwillinR 
to license federally funded technologies. The 'reasonable pricing' provisions that NIH once 
required in all CRADA [Cooperative Research and Development Agreement) and exclusive license 
negotiations did just that." NIH RESPONSE, slljJra, at pt. F. For a contrary opinion, see Amo & 
Davis, sNJ>ra note 8 (calling for the imposition of price controls). Similarly, Arti Rai has proposed 
that anticipated cost reductions in research and development attributable to utilization of genomics 
to streamline and accelerate trials be used as a basis for "scaling back" patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals. SH Arti K. Rai, The Injof'111ation RnoiNtion Rl«hls Pharmaa11tirals: Balancing I nlfovalion 
Incentives, Cost, andAcms in the Post-Gmom«s Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 173 (2001). However, 
presumably use of pharmacogenomics, bioinformatics, and related technologies will result in 
pharmaceuticals tailored to individual genetic profiles, streamlined therapeutic use, regulatory 
approval and labeling limitations, and will significantly fraction traditional disease classifications and 
pharmaceutical markets. Stt FDA Rlg11/ation, rllfJra note 2, at 224. S11 also SMh Oil, sllJ>ra note 3, 
at 31-33. Although industry may off..;et some of this market reduction through the introduction of 
preventive uses for pharmaceuticals, the days of relatively crude pharmaceuticals enjoying broad off­
label use for the full term of their patents are the past, not the future, of life science. Stt id Stt also 
sllfJra note 5. 
22. S tt Shadid, sllfJra note 21. Stt gt11tral!J NIH Rlsponst, slljJra note 21. 
23. Stt gtntra/!J Rai, supra note 8. 
24. CJ MEDICARE REIMBURSEMENT IN CLINICAL TRIALS, Sll/Jrtl note 1. 
25. S11 supra notes 1, 10 and accompanying text. B11t stt Patricia C. Kuszler, C11ring Conflicts 
of Intmsl in Clinical '&starrh: lmposliblt Drtflllls and Harsh Rlalilitr, 8 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 115, 137 
(2001) (citing David Korn, Conflicts of 111/mst in Bio111 dical &starch, 284 JAMA 2234 (2001)). 
"Researchers tend to be passionate and committed to their research hypothesis and may believe that 
it does offer the best hope for alleviation of pain and suffering, even though the preliminary 
research results are not confirmatory." Id. 
26. Avonex is manufactured by Biogen, Inc. of Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
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Herceptin27 for advanced cases of breast cancer, many in the public now perceive 
clinical research as embodying the most inf!QVative and promising treatment 
options. The public is seeking access,28 and the advent ofinformation technology 
is helping to make access possible. Internet sites, including NIH's and the 
National Library of Medicines' listing of clinical trials,29 are linking patients and 
trials. 
In light of the towering and still rising wave of information, the all-knowing 
general practitioner is not a contemporary possibility. Overivhelmed with present 
challenges in an age of managed care, some providers understandably welcome 
patient self'-assertiveness. Similarly, teaching hospitals are no longer able to 
subsidize research through billing, an� many have been pushed out of clinical 
research through the exponential growth of the ContractResearch Organization 
(CRO) industry.30 Several teaching hospitals and acclaimed academic medical 
research centers are beginning to offer clinical research services to industry in a 
manner intended to allow them to compete commercially with CROs.�,1 
27. Herccptin is manufactured by Genentech, Inc. of South San Francisco, California. 
28. From 1995 to 1999, volunteer participation in research increased 39% (from 502,000 to 
more than 700,000). S tt Tom Abate, Ml!Ybt Conflicts of lltltrtsl an S carini Clinical Trial Patients: &port 
that BlanmNtgalivtMtdiaA/so Gtt.r Complaint S11rgt, S.F, CHRON., Apr. 30, 2001, at 01. 
29. Stt http:/ /www.cllnicaltrials.gov, �upra note 1 (det2ils on approximately 5,500 mostly 
government-funded clinical trials). Other government-sponsored sites include the National Cancer 
Institute's clinical trial listing, at http:/ I cancertrials.nci.nih.gov / Qast visited Aug. 23, 2001 ), and the 
AIDS clinical trial information service(AG'TIS),athttp://ww\v.actis.org(last visited Aug. 23,2001). 
There are also several private sites, including the long-eshlblished site maintained by CenterWatch, 
at http:/ /www.centerwatch.com/ Qast visited Aug. 23, 2001); EmeigingMed.com, at 
http://www.emergingmcd.com (last visited Aug. 23, 2001) (privately-funded cancer trials; 
expanding to eover other diseases); Ventasmedicine, at http:/ /www.verimsshedicine.com (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2001) (lists trials and standard treatments for 28 di'>eases); Americasdoctor, at 
http:/ I www.americasdoctor.com (last visited Aug. 23; 2001) (trials in eight disease categories, 
excluding cancer); and Acurian, at http:/ /www.acurian.com (last yisited Aug. 23, 2001) (developing 
lists of trials in 20 disease categories). 
30. Leaders in the CRO industry include Covance Inc., at http:/ /www.covance.com (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2001); P:u:exel International Corporation, at http:/ /www.parexel.com (la:,;t visited 
Aug. 23, 2001); and Quintile:,; Transnational, at http://www.quintiles.com (last visited Aug. 23, 
2001 ). This dramatic increase in clinical research has introduced a demand for professionals such 
a:; clinical research associates (CRAs) and regulatory ·compliance officers that exceeds availability. 
Sit Ronald Rosenberg, Growth in Nt111 Drt1,!J Crratu Nt1d for CRAs: Job Dtniands Incbidt Monitorin.g of 
Ntw Trials, BOSTON GLOBE, May 6, 2001, atj1. 
31. Set, t.g., Liz Kowalczyk, Mtdical Schook Join Foms: Harvard,Othtrs Aim to GiVt Dr111, Firms 
Fasttr OK's on Cfinical Trials, BOSTON GLOBE, July 28, 2000, at Cl, "Harvard University' Medical 
School and four other top US medical schools, worried that private iqdustry is talcing over too much ' 
of human research on ne\v mediCal treatments, have formed an alliance promising drug companies 
faster approval and completion of critical clinical trials." Id.; John Reichard, Acadtmic Medical Cmtm 
Form Rmarrh Alfianct, 54 MED. & HEALTH 3 (2000) (clinical trial collaboration among Baylor 
College of Medicine, the Harvard-affiliated Partners Health System, University of Pennsylvania, 
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Government policy is responsive to, and even encourages, this convergence 
of clinical research and clinical care. First, the Food and Drug Modernization 
Act of 1997 (FDMA) has expanded compassionate use, accelerated review, and 
approval of innovative, breakthrough drugs via the '�fast track."32 The latter has 
balanced accelerated review and access with more extensive compilation of Phase 
IV data and oversight.33 Second, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has 
introduced a comprehensive web site to maximize public access to information 
about clinical trials.34 
Third and most significant, on September 19, 2000, the Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA) announced a final, national coverage decision to 
immediately cover the routine costs of qualifying clinical trials. 35 In addition, 
Medicare decided to cover reasonable and necessary items and services used in 
order to diagnose and treat complications arising from participation in all clinical 
trials.36 This decision is the culmination ofHCFA's tendency over the last several 
years to cover costs associated with clinical research.37 Similarly, at least in recent 
years, the trend �ong private payers has been to more readily cover 
experimental therapies rather than risk litigation and media criticism,311 further 
Vanderbilt University, and Washington University School of Medicine). 
32. 21 U.S.C. § 356 (Supp. V 1995-2000). 
33. Sttid. 
34. Stt http:/ /www.clinicaltrials.gov, sllfJra note 1. 
35. See HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMIN., MEDICARE COVERAGE POLICY-CLINil.AL 
TRIALS, FINAL NATIONAL COVERAGE DEC!SION [hereinafter HCFA DECISION], at 
http:/ /www.hcfa.gov/ coverage/8d2.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2001). See also DEP'T OF HEALTH 
& HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMIN., HCFA FACT SHEET, MEDICARE 
COVERAGE ROUTINE COSTS OF BENEFICIARIES IN CLINICAL TRIAL°' (2000), al http:// 
www.hcfa.gov I medlearn/ ctfsl 3.pdf. 
36. Stt id Coverage under this decision excludes "the investigational item or service, itself, 
items and services provided solely to satisfy data collection and analysis needs and that are not used 
in the direct clinical management of the patient ... ; and items and services customarily provided 
by the research sponsors free of charge for any enrollee in the trial." HCFA, DECISION, J·llfJra note 
35. 
37. See MEDICARE REIMBURSEMENT IN CLINICAL TruALS, sllfJra note 1, at 33-34. For 
example, HCFA has been covering costs associated with 96% of the investigational medical devices 
in clinical research since 1995. Id at 34. 
38. Set gtntraf!y GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH INSURANCE: COVERAGE OF 
AUTOLOGOUS BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTATION FOR BREAST CANCER, GAO/HEHS-96-83 
(Apr. 24, 1996). ''Too often, judicial determinations lack medical and scientific soundness, and 
innovative medical technologies are forced into use through litigation and legal liability only to be 
seriously questioned later." Snalu Oil, sllfJra note 3, at 38-39 & n.67 (addressing reliance on a 
subsequently discredited study for covering thousands of autologous bone marrow transplantations 
in breast cancer patients). "Courts err and order payment for not only unproven, but dangerous 
therapies." Kuszler, sllfJra note 25, at n.35 (citing Mark R. Tonelli et al., Clinical Experimmtation: 
Lmonsfrom l...1"'g Vo/nme &dlldion S11rgery, 110 CHEST 230, 235 (1996)). 
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fueling federal and state legislative ini��es
. 
to. expand patient rights.39 . 
As 
acknowledged by the Institute of Medicm� m its 19?6 . report on Medicare 
reimbursement in clinical trials, the Amencan Association of  Health Plans 
generally encourages reimbursement for the routine costs of care associated �th 
NIH-sponsored trials, and several large private health plans have been routinely 
covering cancer research trials conducted by the National Cancer Institute.40 
Ill. REGULATORY CHAllENGES 
The threat of pervasive, unchecked conflicts of interest in clinical research, 
which jeopardize research integrity, the well being of subjects, and public trust, 
is largely attributable to parallel weaknesses in two of the regulatory regimes 
fundamental to biomedical research: (1) federal technology transfer; and (2) the 
protection of human subjects. As discussed below, the weaknesses of each 
regime are twofold: (1) insufficiencies in the regimes themselves; and (2) a failure 
of federal agencies to exercise existing discretion and to enforce relevant 
standards and regulations. Regulations tailored to conflicts of interest simply 
shadow these insufficiencies by relying heavily upon self-enforcement by funding 
recipients. 
A. Weaknesses in the Regulatory 'Regime for Technology Transfer 
Despite the measurable successes of the United States' federal technology 
transfer policy,41 there is also ample reason for concern. As successful as the 
�edera� technology transfer regime (illustrated in figure 1) has been in advancing 
life science, the scheme embodies ridiculously little reliable accountability. 
Presently, the entire system of federal technology transfer (i.e., distribution of 
b�ons of dollars in research funding) is a chain of delegation of accountability 
which passes through recipient institutions and rests largely with the individual 
researchers who are being funded.42 
3_9- St� ,gtntraf!y David Espo, Bush Sttks Dtal on Palitnts' BiU, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 1 ,  200 1 ,  
at ��
.
; Sue ,Kirchhoff, Battlt Bn1111 Outr S11ils vs. HMOs Iss11t Sten K!J To OK of BiU on Patitnts' Rights, Hos I ON C1LOllE, June 1 8, 2001, at A 1 .  




• J • 
4 1 .  Stt gtntral!J NIH RESPONSE, sllj>ra note 21 ; GAO REPORT, sllj>ra note 8. 
42. An analogy can be drawn to having an Internal Revenue Code without the enforcement mechanism of the Internal Revenue Service. 
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Although the federal technology transfer regulations call for the reporting of 
all inventions developed with federal funding, NIH is the only granting agency 
with a viable information system, the Edison system, which has taken too long 
to develop and still awaits uniform implementation.43 In fact, in its report 
warning against government attempts to recoup investment in biomedical 
research, NIH readily acknowledges that "[i]t is clear that information relating to 
inventive discoveries and their commercial development is reported neither 
systematically nor consistently,"44 and that NIH is unable to trace federal funding 
among commercial pharmaceuticals with reliability.45 
As stated in the GAO report, funding agencies include requirements in their 
agreements, but generally rely heavily on research institutions. However, research 
institutions in tum rely upon their individual researchers who are the ultimate 
funding recipients.46 Although most- major universities have introduced 
extensive, automated information processing systems, the universities often 
separate administration of grant management from technology transfer 
43. GAO REPORT, slljJra note 8, at 3-4. 
44. NIH REsPONSE, slljJra note 21, at pt. E. 
45. Id. at pt. D. NIH calls for the creation of a database that will help NIH determine the 
role that federal money plays in drug development with precision. See id. 
46. GAO REPORT, slljJra note 8, at 3.2-3.4. 
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operations. Further, universities depend heavily upon their individual �esearchers 
for day-to-day oversight and compliance with the thousands of material trans fers 
and other technology agreements in operatiqn,47 Offices of technology transfer 
are churning out extraordinary amounts of technology via licensing and other 
agreements that often encompass voluminous amounts of time and call for 
constant oversight, reporting, and monitoring. Many of these agreements are 
ongoing in nature, because they require monitoring for second-generation (and 
even third-generation) technologies. Yet technology transfer audits, both at the 
institutional and federal agency level, are few and far between.48 In an era of 
research collaboration, the accountability at issue involves corporate partners as 
well as agency research sponsors. 
Despite these accountability limitations, in order to apply as much research as 
possible, institutions have quickly moved into taking equity interests.49 
Unfortunately many institutions have not first developed decisive policies to 
address issues such as liquidation of these interests, nor have they delegated the 
management of such interests to outside third parties. 50 The latter can be price 
prohibitive, especially given present limitations on technology transfer revenue 
streams. Most institutions have not yet reached the point of meaningfully 
exceeding costs.51 
B. Weakneues in the Regulatory &gime for Protection of Human Suijects 
The regulatory regimes to protect human subjects52 and scientific integrity 
largely predate the vast integration of academia and industry promoted through 
47. This observation is based upon the author's experience practicing in the field of 
technology transfer and participation in forums with others engaged in the practice and 
management of technology transfer. 
48. Set gmra/fJ NIH RESPONSE, tlljJra note 21 .  
49. Set Piercey, tupra note 8. 
. S?. Thi_s �bservation is based upon the author's experience practicing in the field, researching 
umvcrnty policies, and reported incidents of researchers holding equity interests in their research 
sponsors. See also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Biomedicine It &ctiving New Sm1ti'!} at Scientists Become 
�ntreprene11rs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2000, at 26 (reporting on incidents involving Dr. Ronald G. 
C:rystal _at Cornell University's Weil Medical College, Jeffrey M. Isner at St. Elizabeth's Medical 
�-;
_
nter m Boston, and Dr. James Wilson at the University of Pennsylvania). See also Cho, supra note 
51 .  See MASSACHUSETIS INST. OF TECH., TECH. & LICENSING OFFICE, GUIDE TO THE 
OWNERSHIP, �ISTRIBUTION AND COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF M.l.T. TECHNOLOGY ot 
http://wcb.m1t.edu/tlo/www/guide.1 .html (last visited Aug. 23, 2001). 
' 
52. "Human subject" is defined differently under DHHS policy (Common Rule), 45 C.F.R. 




p�licy regulations, 21 C.F.R. § 56. 102(e) (2001). Specifically, FDA 
re�latJOn:-; e�dude r��earch lin11ted to data analysis from its definition of human subjects research, 
while DHHS s dc�mitton encompasses analysis of data containing individually identifiable private mformation. Stt uf. 
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federal technology transfer policy. 53 Some of the inadequacies in the regime have 
captured public and government attention through highly-reported conflicts 
controversies.54 Notable examples include the circumstances surrounding the 
death o f  Jesse Gelsinger, an 18-year-old �enc-therapy subject in a protocol 
approved by the University of Pennsylvania; 5 arguments between acadenucs and 
companies over the release of clinical data, such as the debate between Immune 
Response and researchers at the University of California and Harvard 
University;56 journal violations of their own conflicts policies, including the 
renowned New England ]011rnal of Medicine-,57 and an uncomfortable level of 
53. The United States regulatory regime for protection of human subjects and the underlying 
international accords are discussed in BIOTECHNOLOGY, sttpro note 2, at ch. 9 and in 
PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, I.LP, INSTITtmONAL REvIEW BoARD (IRB) REFERENCE BOOK 
(Michele K. Russell-Einhorn & Thoma.� Puglisi, eds., 2001) (hereinafter IRB REFERENCE HOOK). 
54. As stated by Dr. Korn, "{rJecent reports claiming inadequacie11 in univcn;ity systems of 
protection of human research participants and alleging linkage of individual and institutional 
financial conflicts of interest to the deaths of research participants sound a clarion call to the 
academic medical community to come together to address these critical issues." David Korn. 
ConjlictJ oflntmsl in Biom1dica/R111arrh, 284 JAMA 2234, 2236 (2000). 
55. Ste UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA HEALTII SYS., INST. FOR HUMAN GENE THERAPY. 
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS REPORTED ON TIIE DEATII OF JESSE GELSINGER, al http:// 
www.med.upenn.edu/ihgt/findings.hbnl (last visited Aug. 23, 2001); Gelsinger v. Trustees of the 
Univ. of Pa., Case No. 000901885 (Ct. Com. Pl., Phila. County, filed Sept. 18, 2000), at 
http:/ /www.sskrplaw.com/ links/healthcare2.hbnl Qast visited Aug. 23, 2001); Thomas Petzingcr 
Jr., Yes, Technology Stems lo Changt Almos/ Dai!J. B11150111  Tntrds an LJlu!J lo &main in Fom far a Long 
Time, WALL ST. J., Jan. 1 ,  2000, at R 1 2. 
56. Ste Eric Niiler, Comp01!J, AcadntiaA11111 011n' Data, 1 8  NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1235 
(2000). 
57. Stt Linda A. Johnson, N1111 E11gla1ul Jo1m1al of Mttli&int Adl1tits Lapm in Ethi's Poli9, 
CHICAGO SUN-1iMES, Feb. 24, 2000, at 21 (reporting that the New England Journal of Medicine 
admitted violating its financial conflict-of-interest policy 19 times over the past three years in its 
selection of doctors to review new drug treatments). The primary guidance for conflict of interest 
management by medical journals is the Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts Submitted to 
Biomedical Journals, a consensus document issued and subsequently revised by the International 
Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) and allegedly utilized by more than 500 journals. 
Stt International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, Uniform &1pnm111nb farMan11.1mpls S11bmitted 
lo Biomedical Journa/J, 277 JAMA 927, 927 (1997). Set a/Jo infra note 58 (beginning in June 2001 ,  
ICMJE will require journals to ensure that authors of submitted articles must have final say over 
their conclusions). For a list of journals that utilize these requirements, see http:// 
www.icmje.org/jrnlsthtml (last visited Sept. 4, 2001). Stt'aiso Erica Rose,Finanaa/Conj/icl.tojlntmsl: 
How arr 111111tanaJing?, 8 WIDENER L. SYMP.]. 1 ,  25-28 (2001). Despite widespread utilization of the 
ICMJE requirements, according to a report published in the April 2001 issue of Science and 
Engineering Ethics by Sheldon Krimsky and co-authors from the University of California at Los 
Angeles, "[i]n reviewing 61 ,134 scholarly articles published in 181  academic journals in 1997, 
researchers . . . found that just one-half of 1 pe!cent detailed personal financial interests, including 
consulting arrangements, honorariums, expert witness fees, company equity and stock, and patents." 
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correlation between industry sponsorship of clinical research and reporting of  
favorable results. 58 
Direct federal jurisdiction over hwnan subject research encompasses all 
research conducted or supported by the federal government and research 
regulated under a specific federal statute. 59 At thi� time,
. 
hwn�n s�bject research 
neither regulated by the FDA (meaning not involving an tnvestlgat1onal dru� nor 
supported by the federal government is not subject to direct fed�ral overs.
1ght. 60 
Nevertheless, as a practical matter, in most instances, research will be subject to 
oversight by multiple federal agencies (such as the Office for Hu�an Research 
Protection (OHRP), the Department of Health and Human Se�ces (DHHS) 
and the FDA, which have nearly identical but independent regulations for human 
subject protection).61 
These regulations are implemented through requirements that accompany 
federal funding (front-end assurances), and requirements enforced through the 
FDA as a precondition for accepting data in conjunction with a New Drug 
Application (NDA) or New Biologic Application (NBA) (post-hoc audits).62 The 
former, the fundamental regulations implementing federal policy known as the 
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Sattttist; Ofte11 M11111 Abo11t Tit; To !ttdmhy, N. Y. nMES, Apr. 25, 2001 , at A 17. 
Moreover, those disclosures all appeared in just one-third of the 181 journals. Id 
58. According to a study reviewing clinical trials for cancer drugs, trials "funded by 
pharmaceutical companies were nearly 8 times less likely to reach unfavorable qualitative 
conclusions than nonprofit-funded studies." Mark Friedberg et al., Eva/11ation of Conflict of I ntm1t in 
Economic A11a!Jm ofN1111 D111g1 U1td i11 011colagy, 282 JAMA 1 453, 1 455 (1999). In May 2001 , ICMJE 
a�eed to establi..,h a new policy to ensure that "authors of articles submitted to their publications 
must have final say over the conclusions." Ste &search Witho11tSpi11, BoSTON GLOBE, Aug. 9, 2001 ,  
at A 1 8. 
59. Stt IRB REFERENCE BOOK, JlljJra note 53, at 20-21. 
60. Id at 20. Stt NAT'L BIOE'IlllCS ADVISORY COMM'N, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN 
RK'\EARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS (May 1 8, 2001), at http://bioethics.gov/press/ 
ftnalrecommS-1 8.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2001) (proposing establishment of a single, independent 
federal office to implement a unified, single set of regulations and guidance). 
61 .  Stt 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2000) (referring to DHHS protection for human subject 
regulations); 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2001) {referring to FDA informed consent regulations). Set also 
DEP'T OF llEAL'lll & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, 
COMPLIANCE OVERSIGHT PROCEDURES {2000) (hereinafter COMPLIANCE OVERSIGHT 
PROCEDURK<;j, al http://www.ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/compovr.htm (last visited Aug. 23, 2001). 
Stt gt�traJ!? 21 C.F.R. pt. 56 (2001). The FDA also has additional regulations pertaining to 
lnvesttgatio�� New Drug Applications. 21 C.F.R. § 600.3 (2001). Sttgtntral!J 21 C.F.R. pt. 312 
(2001);  21  C.l•.R pt. 812 (2001); BIOTECHNOLOGY, JlljJra note 2,  at ch. 9. 
62. IRB REPERENCE BooK, JllfJra note 53; BIOTECHNOLOGY, JllfJra note 2, at ch. 9. Stt a/Jo 
Jeffrey L. Fox, Swttping Biotlhital &fa,,,, Proposals Gu11t11rplated far Trials, 1 8  NATURE 
BIOTE<:HNOLOGY 1 237 (2000). 
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Common Rule,63 delegate responsibility to recipient institutions, charging them 
with establishing institutional review boards (IRBs) for review of individual 
research protocol proposals. This regulatory regime is illustrated in figure 2. 
HUMAN SUBJECT PROTECTIONS: 
(Figure 2) 
The net effects of this regime are the dual protections of informed consent 
and IRB review.64 IRBs and the researchers they oversee are accountable for a 
63. Ste genera/fy IRB REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 53; BIOTECHNOLOGY, slljJra note 2, at ch. 
9. 
64. Exemptions from the dual protections of informed consent and IRB review, as set forth 
under 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (b) (2000), are restricted to research activities in which human subject 
involvement is limited to one or more of the following categories: (a) research on instructional 
techniques, curricula, or classroom management methods conducted in established educational 
settings; (b) research on the use of educational tests and survey and interview procedures, unless 
subjects can be identified and disclosure could put the subjects at risk; (�) research on the use of 
educational tests and survey and interview procedures if the subjects ardpublic officials candidates I 
for public office, or the confidentiality of personally identifiable information is protected by statute; 
(d) research involving the collection or study of existing data or specimens which are publicly 
available or not identifiable; (e) research to evaluate the effectiveness of agency programs; and (f) 
taste and food quality evaluations where ingredients are deemed safe by a federal agency. 45 C.F.R. 
§ 46.101 (b). See IRB REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 53, at 65-67. FDA also exempts certain clinical 
investigations from IRB requirement:;-for example, an investigation involving emergency use of 
a test article when the emergency is reported to an IRB within five working days. Stt 21 C.F.R. § 
62 Widener Law Symposium ]011maJ [Vol. 8:47 
myriad of review and reporting requirements. 65 Neverthless, IRBs are comprised 
56.104(c)-(d) (2001). Moreover, FDA is authorized to waive the IRB requirement for specific 
research activities, S�e 21 , C.F.R. § 56. l()� (�1 ). S re a4o IRJ3 REFEllE�CE, BOOK, supra note 53, 
at 65-67. For guidance on implementatio�· 6t thes� regulations, OPRR ep;cdece�sor to OHRP) has 
provided the decisiC?n trees ,rcp!oduced �.Figure ?-1,1 and Fi�r�.?� 1 .? ... '.fhese decision trees and 
additionaJ guidance are available . at . Office for H\lmap ;
. Research 
.
.•  Protections, DHHS, at 
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• Prompt reporting of 3::11y unanticipated proplems involving ris� to subjects or others. 
See 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(b)(5) (2000); 21 C�f''.R. ,§ 56.108(b)(1) (2001). . ·  
. 
• Notification (a)'to the FDA by.(agirriile '()�pther �9�g as soclll as pos&ible, no later 
than seven calendar days, of.thi Spcl��ts receipt of tltelriforrnati()n of:tny tmexpected 
fatal or life-threateriihg'expcnen�� with the u�e ()fan experimef.lW drµg or biologic; and 
(b) to the FDA �d all participitfrig in"VeSt:jgato.rs �s sog": as possible, no later than 1 5  
calendar days, after the sponsor.d�tt#'m�e� 'tl1at ll!.e}lf:� �perimenblJ drug or biologic 
is both serious and unexpected. S11 2fc.F.R  § 312.32{c)(l)-(2) (2001); 21 C.F.R. § 
312.64(a)-(b) (2001 ). 
• Sponsor notification to clinical inv�stiga�ors of all "new observations," particularly 
those pertaining to adverse effects arid safe tise. S'N 21 C.F.R. § 312.55 (2001). 
• Investigator notification. to. re�c,arc� sponsors .of ariY adverse effects that may be 
reasonably regarded as being caused by th� dtug. Jt�.2tYC.FJt'§ 312.64(b) (2001). 
• Investigator notific�tion Withiri ten wC>rkingdays tC>�pC>nrors and overseeing IRBs 
of any unanticipated adverse effects. Su 21 C.F.R. § 812.46(b) (2001). In turn, within 
ten days of receiving the information,, sponsors must evaluate the event and report to the FDA, all participating investigators, and all reviewing IRBs. Stt 21 C.F.R. § 812.46(c) 
(2001). . . ·
. 
• . . . . .. . .·  .· 
Although the FDA do�s not:currcntly ie�uke IRB iegistriltion, all IRBs and Institutional 
Ethics Coriiffiitl:ee:{ (IECs) operating fo colljund:ion With an OHRP FederaJ-wide Assurance of 
Protection for Human Subjects must register with DHHS. " Stt Office for Human Research 
Protections, IRB Registration and Assurance Filing Procedures General Information, at 
http://ohrp.osophs. dhhs.gov/humansubjects/assurance/refinfo.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2001). 
Other IRBs and IECs are encouraged to register voluntarily to facilitate effective communication 
with D HHS. See id 
In addition, federal regulations mandate that IRBs embody the expertise necessary to 
review the variety of research theIRB will review, are sufficiently knowledgeable of human subject 
regulations, and practice impartiality. Sei 21 C.F.R. § 56.107(a) (2001); lRB REFERENCE BOOK, 
supra note 53, at 84. The regulations aJso stipulate that IRBs consist of at least five members and 
be professionally, culturally, and racially diverse and gender balanced. Su IRB REFERENClfBooK, 
supra note 53,"at 85-86. Each IRB must have at least one member whose primacy concerns are in 
non-scientific areas, and at least one non-scientist member must be present for an IRB to conduct 
business at convened meetings. Stt id at 86. 
_ 
. Federal regulations aJso impose an obligation on redpients of National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) funding to receive sufficient education about the 'Protection of human subjects. See 
NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, GUIDEl.INES FOR THE CONDUCT OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN 
SUBJECTS AT TuE NATIONAL INSTJTUTF.s OF HEALTH (revised Mar. 2, 1995), at http:// 
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of members who volunteer their time, the majority of which are drawn from the 
institution's own community and are colleagues of those submitting protocols for 
IRB approval.11<• Criticisms of the IRB system, especially after they were 
documented in a four-part report issued by the O ffice of Inspector General in 
1998, have become well-known: (1) IRBs are overwhelmed and, therefore, often 
take short-cuts in their review--c.g., making decisions on research proposals 
without the full committee; (2) IRBs often lack the necessary expertise to 
adequately review specific protocols; (3) IRBs are subject to institutional and peer 
pressures, and ( 4) after approval, IRBs often are lax in ongoing 
oversight67-meaning that IRBs have virtually no contact with human subjects 
or researchers once research is underway. 68 
ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines.php3 Qast visited Sept. 4, 2001). Investigators who submit funding 
applications must describe the relevant education of key personnel, which includes "all individuals 
responsible for the design and conduct of the study and include graduate students, technicians, 
research associates and other professionals." IRB REFERENCE BOOK, 111jm1 note 53, at 87. 
Moreover, OHRP has recently emphasized the obligation of institutions to provide IRR operational 
support sufficient to satisfy federal obligations, and OHRP has cited institutions for insufficiently 
supporting their IRB and human subject protection operations. Stt t,t11tral!J COMPLIANCE 
OVERSIGHT PROCEDURES, 111/Jr<I note 6 1 .  
66. To meet competency requirements mandated under federal law, IRBs may invite 
individuals with special expertise to assist in reviewing specific issues, but such consultants may not 
vote with the IRB. Stt IRB REFERENCE BooK, JllfJra note 53, at 86. Research institutions also may 
tum to commercial or independent IRBs and enter into agreements with other instirutions to use 
their IRB review process. Stt id at 84-85. In fact, the latter may be an emerging trend. 
Id. at 85. 
The Office for Human Research Protection (OHRP) has recently approved 
an innovative approach for multiple institutions that are working collectively 
on research. The Multicenter Academic Clinical Research Organization 
(MACRO) is a unique partnership of five leading academic centers with a 
reciprocal IRB approval process. One of the five university IRBs is designated 
as the IRB of record for each collaborative. Once the designated IRB 
approves the research, review by the IRBs at the other four MACRO 
institutions in unnecessary. 
67. Moreover, IRBs are required to engage in continuing review of research, including review 
of investigator requests for study changes, and a meaningful review not less than once per year. Stt 
45 C.F.R. § 46.1 09(e) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 56.1 09(t) (2001). IRBs are authorized to engage in post­
approval reviews at intervals of less than one year to reflect levels of risk, and are required to 
provide written guidance on how they will make these risk-review assessments in their Standard 
Operating Procedures. Stt 45 C.F.R. § 46. 1 03(b)(4)(i.i) (2000). 
68. Stt gnttra'!J IRB REFERENCE BoOK, Ill/Jra note 53; DEP"r HEALTII & HUMAN SERVS . , 
INS1TI1JTIONALREvIEWBoARDS:ATIMEFORREFORM, PUB.NO. OEI-01 -97-00193 (1998); DEP"r 
HEAL'IlJ & HUMAN SERVS., INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS: THEIR ROLE JN REVIEWING 
APPROVED RESEARCH, PUB. No. OEI-01-97-00190 (1 998) (hereinafter ROLE JN REVIEW!; DEP"f 
HEAL'IlJ & HUMAN SERVS., INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS: TuE EMERGENCE OF 
INDEPENDENT BOARDS, PUB. No. OEl-01-97-00192 (1 998); DEP"r HEALTII & HUMAN SERVS., 
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Even given these weaknesses in the regulatory re�e to p�otect .human subjects, the regime's lack of reliability as a. safe��d agamst. conflicts o� mteres t is largely attributable to a failure to exerose existing oversight authority. The 
DHHS (including OHRP, NIH, and the ��) �olds b�oad jurisdiction over 
clinical research-meaning there is ample junsdicttonal latttude for enforcement 
of conflicts standards and regulatory reform.69 
C Complementary Weaknesses in Conflicts Regulations 
Meaningful avoidance and management of conflicts of interest presupposes 
that institutions have full and ongoing knowledge of their technology trans fer 
and human subject research activities, including those undertaken through 
collaborations. However, as discussed above, the reality is a ridiculously low level 
of accountability, which now is being acknowledged by the ins titutions 
themselves70 and NIH in the context of opposing the imposition of additional 
conditions on the commercialization of government-sponsored research.7 1  The 
convergence of clinical research and clinical care72 exacerbates concerns. 
Existing conflicts-of-interest regulations simply complement the technology 
transfer and human subject protection regulatory schemes, and shadow their 
weaknesses by relying heavily upon self-compliance by institutions and 
researchers who are funding recipients.73 Although federal regulations mandate 
the disclosure of financial interests by individuals who apply to the Public Health 
Service (PHS)1• and the National Science Foundation (NSF) for research 
funding,75 these regulations are limited in scope.76 For example, PHS and NSF 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BoARDS: PROMISING APPROACHES, PUB. No. OEl-01-91-001 91  (1998); 
Symposium: H11111an S11f1tds Rlstorrh and tht Role oflnstiflllional&vitw Boorrls-Conflicts and Challengu, 
28 J .  AM. Soc'Y L. MED. & ETHICS 329 (2000). 
69. Stt Fox, stpranote 62; Rose, stpranote 57. For example, the FDA is authorized to review 
IRBs, clinical investigatoni, research sponsors, and institutional oversight ofboth clinical and animal 
laboratories. Stt 21 C.F.R. § 56.1 15(b) (2001); 21 C.F.R. § 312.68 (2001). The FDA may require 
IRBs and their institutions to: (a) withhold approval of new studies; (b) prohibit the enrollment of 
new subject"; (c) terminate ongoing studies; (d) notify other agencies of institutional noncompliance; 
and (c) for serious noncompliance, even disqualify an IRB. See 21 C.F.R. § 56.1 20(b) (2001); 21  
C.F.R. § 56.120(a) (2001). Ste a/so IRB REFERENCE BOOK, stpra note 53, at 307. 
70. Carey Goldberg, Metli,al Schools Offer RN/es on Doctors' Conflict oflntemt, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
8, �00� , at A23. Several top schools, including Harvard, "are proposing stringent conflict-of-interest 
guidelines for doctor-researchers who have financial stakes in their work." Id. 
71 .  Set genm1f!y NIH RESPONSE, stpra note 21 . 
72. Ste stpra Part II. 
7�. For a thorough, technical treatment of the regulatory regime, policy statements, and 
professional standards for financial conflicts of interest, see generally Rose, stpra note 57 . 
. 74 .. See Respon:;ibility of Applicants for Promoting Objectivity in Research for Which PHS 
l'und10g is Sought, 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.601 -50.607 (2000). These regulations date back to 1995. Id. 75. S tt Rules of Practice for the National Science Foundation, 45 C.F.R. §§ 680.10-680. 1 3  
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regulations exclude equity interests having a fair market value ofless than St  0 ,000 
and that do not constitute an ownership interest greater than five percent in any 
single entity.n The regulations also exclude regular salaries paid by the 
application institution, royalties paid by the application institution, honoraria paid 
for service to public or non-profit groups, and salaries, royalties, and honoraria 
from private and for-profit groups, provided that total payments do not exceed 
$10,000 over a twelve-month period.78 Similarly, the reporting threshold under 
FDA regulations is $25,000 in excess of the documented costs of conducting the 
research or clinical trial.79 The FDA regulations prohibit investigators from 
having financial interests in the technologies they are testing beyond those 
disclosed and deemed allowable. 80 
To implement these requirements, PHS regulations require applicant 
institutions to maintain and enforce written conflict of interest policies, to inform 
investigators about these policies and PHS regulations, to appoint an institutional 
official to collect and evaluate financial disclosure statements from investigators 
before the institution applies for PHS funding, and to maintain sufficient 
records. 81 FDA regulations hold investigators responsible for making requisite 
disclosures directly to the FDA.82 Nevertheless, under these regulations, 
individuals only have to report financial in tcrests related to the research proposal 
for funding, and make this disclosure only to institutional officials or directly to 
the FDA-meaning not publicly, and not even to the subjects in their studies.A3 
(2000). 
76. Clarification is available at Frequently Asked Questions Concerning the Department of 
Health and Human Services Objectivity in Research Regulations and the National Science 
Foundation Investigator Financial J)i$dosure Policy, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,839 Ouly 3, 1996). Se1 also 
Rose, rllj>nJ note 57. 
77. 42 C.F.R. § 50.603(1), (3)-(S) (2000). 
78. Se1 id; 21 C.F.R. §§ 54.1 -54.6 (2001); FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT: GUIDANCE FOR 
[NDUSTRY: FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE BY CLJNTCAL INVESTIGATORS (Oct. 26, 1999). 
79. These regulations were finalized in 1998, took effect in February 1999, and subsequendy 
have been clarified by draft guidance published in October 1999 and finalized on March 28, 2001 . 
See FOOD & DRUG AOMIN., DEr'T HEALTII & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR [NDUSTRY: 
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE BY CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS (2001) (hereinafter FDA GUIDANCEJ, al 
http:/ /www.fda.gov/oc/guidance/financialdis.html Qast visited Sept. 4, 2001). 
80. S1e id The regulations also require general investigator disclosure of financial interests 
exceeding $50,000 in any publicly held company. 21  C.F.R. §§ 54.1 -54.6 (2001). 
81. See 42 C.F.R. § 50.604(a)-(c) (2000); 42 C.F.R. § 50.603 (2000). Institutions are required 
to certify these conflict of interest policies and procedures with the Public Health Service. Stt 42 
C.F.R. § 50.604(&)(1) (2000). 
82. Su FDA GUIDANCE, rllj>n:t note 79. These disclosures must be made while the study is 
ongoing and within one year after completion. See id 
83. See 1,eneraJ& Korn, rlljJra note 25, at 2236; Cho, rllj>ra note 1 2. The FDA has provided 
reassurances that financial information about investigators will be disclosed publicly only in 
instances where a public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs an individual researcher's privacy 
66 Widener Law Symposium Journal [Vol. 8:47 
Unfortunately, the majority of U.S. research institutions have not even risen 
to the occasion of generating sufficient conflicts of interest guidelines. ''Most 
policies on conflict of interest at major US rese�ch institutions lack specificity 
about the kinds .of relationships with industry that are permitted or prohibited."84 
This fact is even more troubling when considered in light of the absence of 
technology transfer auditing and reliable information management by funding 
agencies, as readily acknowledged by NIH in �efense of the United States' 
aggressive technology transfer policy.85 
D. Implications for Clinical &search 
The human health benefits of making breakthrough products-especially 
those for life-threatening anq presently untreatable conditions-accessible to 
patients prior to full marketapproval may be beyond question at this time due 
to the prolific state of biomedical research. 86 Nevertheless, the present regulatory 
regime for ,protecting human subjects is unreliable in general, 87 and certainly 
_,_. ·-·· .· -. 
interests. See.gennri4' J:<l:>AGulDANCE, s'ipm note..79. 
In the US., the reasonable-physidan s�dard, whiC:h is applied from the 
provider's perspective and rests ori medical judgment, gradually has been 
t"eplaced :by a material-risks standard. Under the latter, the boundaries of the 
disclosure rest on the individual patient's need to know, not on prevailing and 
somewhatpatemalistic medical standards. 
BIOTECHNOLOGY, .tlljJra note 2, at § :9.03{B](1]. Written consent forms for non-FDA-approved 
drugs should provide subjects with the information necessary to enable them to calculate their own 
risk '-to-benefit ratio. S tt id at§ 9 .03 {BJ (2] . Relevant regulations mandate that consent forms include 
eight basic elements, with potentially six additional subparts for research involving more than 
minimal rtsk. Stt 45 C.F.R. § 46.1 16(a) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a) (2001). Stt also IRB 
REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 53, at 164-168. Moreover, the regulations expressly state that the 
forms must not contain language that could be considered exculpato£f. Ste 45 C.F.R. § 46. 1 1 6  
(2000); 2 1  C.F.R. § 50.20 (2001). ·• ···.· · 
Exculpatory language is described in the regulations as language through 
· which the subject or the subject's representative is made to waive or appear to 
waive any of the subject's legal rights or releases or appears to release the 
fovestigator, the sponsor, the institution, or in; agents from liability for 
negligence. 
IRB REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 53, at 163. · OHRP recently issued further relevant guidance. 
Stt OFFICE OF HUMAN RESEARCH PROTHcnONS, DRArr INTERIM GUIDANCE: FINANCIAL 
RELATIONSHIPS IN CLINICAL R.E.c;EARCH: ISSUES FOR INSTITUTIONS, CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS, 
AND IRBs TO CONSIDER WHEN DEALING WITil ISSUES OF FINANCIAL INTERESTS AND HUMAN 
SUBJECT PROTEcnON (2001) (hereinafter OHRP DRAFT GUIDANCE], at http:// 
ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/humansubjects/finreltn/finguid.htm Qast visited Aug. 23, 2001). 
84. Cho, mpm note 12, at 2208. 
85. Stt NIH R.E.<iPONSE, slljJra note 21, at pt. E. 
86. See gt1ttml/y supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
87. Su supm Part III. A. 
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unreliable as a mechanism to police against conflicts of interest.88 Integrating 
clinical research and clinical care means folding the ridiculously low level of 
reliable institutional accountability associated with technology transfer and human 
subjects protection into delivery of care.119 A likely consequence, and one difficult 
to measure given the present lack of institutional accountability,w is exacerbation 
of the prevalence of conflicts of interest that endanger research integrity and the 
protection of human subjects. 
The situation is still further complicated by the fact that the delivery of care 
system and the physicians working within that system are squeezed financially by 
managed care.91 Moreover, increasingly today2s trials involve a collection of 
institutions and transcend borders. 92 With commercial demand for research 
subjects at an all-time high,93 physicians and their institutions have the 
opportunity to reap extraordinary financial returns by becoming subject 
88. For a immmary of the oversight mechanisms for clinical research, see Ralph Snyderman 
& Edward W. Holmes, Ovmighl MechaniS111sjor C/i11i"'IRmorch, 287 SCIENCE 595, 595-97 (2000). 
89. For a discussion of the accountability problem (i.e., over-reliance on over-burdened IRBs 
and self-policing by funding recipients in the absence of reliable technology transfer information 
management and auditing by government sponsors and recipient institutions), see geneml.ly stljJra 
Part III; NIH RESPONSE, stljJro note 21. 
90. Ste 111/mrnote 89. 
9 1 .  S re unerol!J Kenneth E. Thorpe et al., The Impact of HM Os 011 Hospital-Based Uncompensated 
Cart, 26 J. HEALTI-1 POL.<;. POL 'v & L. 543, 544-46 (2001 ); KENNETH M. LUDMERER,TIME TO HEAL: 
AMERICAN MEDICAL EDUCATION PROM THE TURN or THE CENTIJRYTOTim ERA O F  MANAGED 
CARE (1999). 
92. U.S. policy to protect human subjects applies to research conducted in foreign countries.  
See 45 C.F.R. § 46. 101(a) (2000). Therefore, human subjects outside the U.S. must be allotted the 
dual protection of informed consent and IRB review. See IRB REFERENCE BOOK, sllfJra note 53, 
at 340. However, the regulations also embody the possibility of deference to host-country regimes. 
When host countries have implemented protections equivalent to U.S. protections, a "department 
or agency head may approve the substitution of the foreign procedures in lieu of the procedural 
re::quirements provided in this policy." 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (h) . Data and Safety Monitoring Boards 
(DSMB) are required for multi-site clinical trials that entail potential risk to participants. Su 45 
C.F.R. § 46. 1 1 1  (a)-(b) (2000); DEPT HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.: International Conference on 
Harmonisation; Good Clinical Practice Consolidated Guideline, 62 Fed. Reg. 25,692, 25,701 (May 
9 ,  1997); IRB REFERENCE BOOK, IllJ>ro note 53, at 286. This oversight is distinct from IRB study 
review and approval requirements. Id at 287. 
93. Microarray (e.g., DNA chip) and bioinformatics capabilities are raising the utility 
of-meaning the amount of useful information that can be derived from--and demand for subject 
samples to an all-time high. Cf S nolu Oil, ntpra note 3. However, information technology is being 
developed with the goal of simulating the effect of new drugs on cells. organs, and systems in the 
human body before clinical testing, thereby potentially streamlining clinical trials. S tt IBM/ Pf?ysiomt 
Sign S NjJtrtomp111i11g/ Biokgical Modtling Pact, MAINFRAME COMPUTING (Oct. 1 ,  2001 ), available ot 2001 
WL 1 2586424 (reporting that IBM's supercomputing technology will be used for biomedical 
research). 
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suppliers. 94 Pressing issues in subject recruitment, given the intensely competitive 
environment for contemporary biomedical R&D, include the payment of 
recruitment incentives for investigators,95 compensation to subjects,96 use of 
medical records,97 and internet recruitment.� The potential for non-financial 
conflicts of interest is equally troubling given the present state of competition in 
biomedical research and demand for research subjects.99 
94. CJ. Frances H. Miller, Tnnting Dodars: TricA!J BNSints.r Wht� It Camu lo Clinical&starrh, 81 
B.U. L. REV. 423 (2001). Although the American Medical Association and other professional 
associations prohibit referral fees, the practice is common to the extent that sponsors often 
"reimburse" referring physicians generously for administrative and other expenses. S tt MEDICARE 
REIMllURSEMENT IN CLINICAL TRIALS, slljJra note 1 ,  at 41-42. For example, based upon data 
available in 1 996, in oncology research physicians are paid $2,500 per patient for industry-sponsored 
trials and $750 per patient from the National Cancer Institute. Stt id. Compensation may also take 
many other forms, such as honoraria for speaking engagements, paid consulting and advisory 
positions, and even equity interests. Su Boyd & Bero, slljJra note 8, at 221 1 .  
95. Stt slljJro note 94. 
96. It is common practice for 11ponsors and even research institutions to compensate subjects 
for participating in research. ''Financial· incentives are often used in the early phases of 
investigational drug, biologic, or device development, especially when health benefits to subjects are 
inconsequential or non-existent" IRB REFERENCE BOOK, mpra note 53, at 228. Given that 
monetary compensation raises questions about subject coercion and compensation to providers and 
their affiliated institutions introduces potential conflicts of interest, institutions should set clear, 
specific policy on compcnsati�n and disclosure even indirectly associated with subject !ecruitment. 
S tt id. IRBs should carefully review proposed recruitment methods and imposed elevated standards 
of disclosure to subjects as put of the informed consent process. See id. at 224. 
97. Traditionally, investigators have used medical records to identify and recruit potential 
research subjects. IRB REFERENCE BOOK, slljJra note 53, at 226. However, that national attention 
placed on medical privacy and implementation of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1 996 (HIPAA), 45 C.F.R. § 1 60 have brought many of thes�. medical record 
review practices into question. 
98. An alternative to use of medical records that is being aggressively pursued is direct 
communication with subjects via advertisements and posting Internet information about trials. Set 
stpra note 96. Generally, the FDA treats Internet postings and advertisements in a similar fashion: 
postings with minimal information do not require IRB review. Stt FOOD. & DRUG ADMIN., 
INFORMATION SHEETS, GUIDANCE FOR INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS AND CLINICAL 
INVESTIGATORS, 1 998 UPDATE, at http://www.fda.gov/ oc/ ohrt/irbs/ toc4.html Qast visited Sept. 
4, 2001). "Conversely, if additional descriptive information is listed on the Internet, IRB review and 
approval may ensure that the additional information does not promise or imply benefits beyond 
what is indicated in the protocol and the informed consent documents." IRB REFERENCE BOOK, 
s11jJra note 53, at 227. r 
99. Stt Kuszler, slljJra note 25, at n.180 and accompanying text. 
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IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
Contemporary financial conflicts of interest are not simply an extension of the 
longstanding non-financial conflicts which have been pervasive for years, and 
clinical research is readily distinguishable from basic research in light of the 
additional human health concerns and bioethical complications. 100 As discussed 
throughout this article, academia and industry have integrated and the 
unprecedented pace of scientific advancement and demand for human subjects 
place extraordinary pressures on researchers and their institutions. 101 
However, academia and industry have integrated and there is no turning back, 
nor should that be considered a desirable policy option.1112 The health science 
community has never been so productive and offered as much promise to 
patients in need.103 The policy objective should be to introduce the level of 
institutional assurance necessary to allow life science to move forward with all the 
collaborative synergies that have advanced the field and improved health care 
thus far. 
Options include maintaining but building upon the present regulatory 
methodology-i.e., relying heavily upon self-regulation by institutions and 
professional societies. In fact, responsive self-regulation initiatives are already 
underway. First, representatives from several of the nation's top medical schools 
(Harvard, Baylor College of Medicine, Columbia University, Johns Hopkins 
University, the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Washington, 
Washington University, Yale University, and the University of California at San 
Francisco and Los Angeles) have jointly drafted conflicts of interest guidelines 
requiring researchers to disclose any financial interests they have in studies 
involving patients.104 Second, rather than continuing to rely on IRBs to manage 
conflicts issues, some institutions have established conflicts committees. 1115 This 
approach introduces an administrative mechanism centered on conflicts rather 
than further over-extending the already overwhelmed IRB system, which has the 
broad mission of protecting human subjects.106 Third, several major professional 
societies have introduced responsive guidelines. For example, the American 
100. SN Korn, Jllj>ra note 25, at 2234-35 (distinguishing contemporary financial conflicts of 
interest from more familiar and pervasive conflictir-i.e., a bias toward positive research 
results-that have generated traditional management mechanisms). 
101. S tt gentraf& Jllj>ra Part I. 
102. SN genera/& NIH RESPONSE, Jllj>ra note 21. B11t Jte &g11/ating Sritntific &1tarrh, Jllj>ra note 
8. 
103. S tt Jllj>ra notes 1 -7 and accompanying text 
104. S tt also Katherine S. Mangan, Medical S chool.r Dreeft Gllidt5nes far Prrventi11g Conjlid1 oflnterr1t, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 23, 2001,  at A36; Goldberg, Jllj>ra note 70. See also infra note 1 1 4. 
105. Set infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. 
106. See ROLE IN REVIEW, mpra note 68. S tt genera/& IRB REFERENCE BOOK, sNJ>ra note 53; 
sllj>ra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
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Society of ?ene Thera�y has_ prohibited r���archers from ta��g equity inte�ests in companies sponsonng trials they run, and th
.
e Association of Amert�an 
Medical Colleges (AAMC) has announced assembling a task force on conflicts 
of interest issues. 108 The American Medical Association (AMA) has adopted a 
policy on conflicts of interest calling on all medical centers to dev�lop 
.
guidelines 
that embody stipulations to avoid perceived as well as actual conflicts in order to 
maintain public trust as well as scientific objectivity and integrity. 109 
Another option is to raise agency standards and enforcement. Along these 
lines, in June 2000, former Secretary of DHHS Donna Shalala replaced the 
Office for Protection from Research Risks (OPRR), which was located within 
NIH, with OHRP. tto OHRP is situated within the Office of the Secretary. 1 t t 
Moreover, on May 23, 2000, then Secretary Shalala announced initiatives to 
expand protections for clinical trial participants, including a NIH clarification of 
conflict of interest rules for federally funded researchers and a promise to host 
public discussion on conflicts of interest management. 112 These reforms also 
included proposals to enhance the FDA's oversight role with additional 
enforcement capabilities such as levying significant sanctions and financial 
107. see AMER. Soc'v OF GENE THERAPY (ASG1), POLICY OF nm A MERI CAN SOCIETY OF 
G ENE THERAPY ON FINANClAL CONFLICT OF INTERE.<iT IN CUNICAL RESEARCH (2000), al 
http:/ /www.asgt.org/policy/index.html Qast visited Sept. 4, 2001). 
1 08. Present AAMC guidelines, in place since 1990, recognize that conflicts of interest are 
inevitable and emphasize the need to manage conflicts of interest. See ASS'N A MER. MED. 
COU.EGES, GUIDELINES FOR DEALING WITH FACUL1Y COt-iFLICTS OF COMMITMENT AND 
CONFLICTS or INTEREST IN RESEARCH (1990), al http:/ /www.aamc.org/ research/ dbr/ coi.htm 
�ast visited Sept. 4, 2001). Ste Rose, s11jm1 note 57, at n.29 and accompanying text. 
109. See generalfy AM. MED. ASS'N, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CONFLICTS 
OF I NTEREST: BIOMEDICAL RF-"EARCH, Op. E-8.031 (1999), al http:/ /www.ama-assn.org/ 
ama/ pub/ category I 2503.html (last visited Aug. 1 5, 2001 ). The AMA calls for implementation of 
guidelines that embody the following stipulations: 
• Investigator cannot buy or sell company stock while involved with said company's 
research and until research results are publicly disclosed. 





gators must disclose relevant financial and other interests in the research sponsor, 
m wntmg, to the relevant medical center and funding organizations. In addition, COI 
disclosure must accompany any journal submissions. 
1 10.  Set IRR REFERENCE BOOK, sll}ra note 53, at 21. 
1 1 1 . Su id. 
> 
1 1 2. Press Release, Department of Health and Human Services, Secretary Shalala Bolsters 
1 ro
.
tccuons for Human Research Subjects (May 23, 2000) (hereinafter DHHS Press Release], 
aiiadahlt at http://www.hhs.gov/ncws/press/2000pres/20000523.html; Donna Shalala Protuling 
&u�rrh Subjects-Whal Miu/ Bt Dont, 343 NRW ENG. J .  MED. 808, 809 (2000). As a rcsuit of these 
public forums, NIH and FDA are expected to develop joint conflicts of interest policies. See Rose 
supra nok 57, at 8. 
' 
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penalties against researchers and institutions. 1 13 Another proposal was to  require 
institutions, academic sponsors, and agencies to utilize and share data resulting 
from safety monitoring boards. 1 14 In addition, during the summer of2000, NIH 
undertook "visits" to recipient institutions throughout the country to see first­
hand how these institutions are dealing with conflicts of interest. 1 15 
To advance meaningful reform, inJune 2000, DHHS also chartered a National 
Research Human Protection Advisory Committee (NRHP AC) to consult with 
both the Secretary and OHRP on issues related to the protection of human 
subjects . 1 1 6  OHRP has now issued a draft guidance encouraging institutions to 
establish conflicts committees expressly responsible for conflict of interest 
management.117 As proposed by OHRP, these committees would be responsible 
for collecting and evaluating information about financial relationships between 
commercial sponsors, investigators, IRB members and staff. These committees 
also will assess potential institutional conflicts of interest in a proactive manner.1111 
More recently, on March 28, 20()1, the FDA issued a final Guidance for Industry 
on Financial Disclosure by Clinical Investigators. 119 This guidance constitutes the 
FDA 's response to the deluge of questions the agency received in response to its 
final regulations.120 
The Bush Administration should establish the Bioethics Advisory Committee 
announced in August, 2001, and then embrace the spirit of comprehensive 
refonn associated with the enactment of federal technology trans fer legislation 
and the modernization of the FDA, which triggered the explosion in life science 
that has now reached the clinic.121 Too much reliance has been placed on 
research institutions for far too long. 122 Both public and private research 
1 1 3. Stt Rose, sll/Jra note 57, at 1 2-14. 
1 14. Stt id. These boards are required for multi-site clinical trials that entail potential risk to 
participants. Stt 45 C.F.R. § 46.1 1 1  (a)-(b) (2000). In June 2000, NIH issued guidance on data and 
safety monitoring for Phase I and Phase It clinical trials. Stt N . .o\T'L INST. OF HEALTH, FURTHER 
GUIDANCE ON A DATA AND SAFE1Y MONITORING FOR PHASE I AND PHASE II TRIAL", Notice 
OD-00-038 Qune 5, 2000), aJ http:/ /grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-00-
038.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2001). 
1 1 5. Ste Patrick Healy,HarvardForN111 Eyt10vmightofBio111edical&starrh, BOSTON GLOBE,July 
21, 2000, at A 1 3. 
1 1 6. Ste Rose, slljJra note 57, at 1 5-16. 
1 1 7. Stt gtneral!J OHRP DRAFT G UIDANCE, .rlljJra note 83. 
1 1 8. Ste ir/. 
1 1 9. Stt FDA GUIDANCE, sllfJra note 79. 
120. Set id. 
121.  Ste !l""af!y NIH RESPONSE, sllfJra note 21; GAO REPORT, slljJra note 8. 
1 22. Set !l""al!J Cho, slljJra note 1 2. According to a recent study, Harvard Medical School is 
the only major academic institution to have established absolute limits on faculty financial interests 
in their research. Set Bernard Lo, et al., Co11f/Ut-ofl11tm1/ PolititS far Invtstigators in Clinical Trials, 343 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1616, 1618-19 (2000). Harvard faculty must not hold more than $20,000 in 
stock or receive more than $1 0,000 in consulting fees and research royalties from sponsors. See id. 
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institutions, as the recipients of vast amounts of public funding and even more 
trust, should be subjected to ehforced standards of academic disclosure in the 
spirit of the rigorous investor disclosure associated with small, publicly traded 
companies. 
Continuing with the initiatives undertaken by former Secretary Shalala, the 
Bush Administration must implement meaningful assurance that conflicts of 
interest (which are pervasive now and will become even more pervasive as 
biomedical research · moves forward) will .not jeopardize the rights of human 
subjects or research integrity. · Institutions have embraced opportunities to 
collaborate introduced under Bayh-Dole, but the institutions have moved 
forward without proper reflection and without . taking needed proactive 
administrative measures to ensure accountability. 123 
First, uniform, workable, ·�nd enforceable federal conflicts of interest 
standards should be directly written into federal technology transfer policy124 and 
implemented in a parallel fashion by all ·. DHHS agencies. The standards 
themselves should . be specific enough to minimize subje<,:tive" interpretation. 
Further, they should err on the side of disclosure, albeit in a manner sensitive to 
commercial ·interests-which is a principle already embodied in federal 
technology transfer policy via the invention .reporting provisions and FDA 
policies. 125 As an immediate measure, NIH technology transfer guidelines should 
be enhanced and made requirements for recipient institutions:126 ·To make this 
approach enforceable, the federal government must immediately implement the 
information management mechanisms essential to trace and account for the 
public's investment in biomedical research from the bench to market. 127 
Second, the same institutions that presently are relied upon to comply with . 
human subjects protection regufations and technology transfer reporting 
requirements should be subject to mandatory f:lisdosure arid compliance audits. 
For example, NIH has requir�d sa�et}' monitoring boards for many types oflarge 
In spite of competitive pressures such as retention of faculty, Harvard recently decided to adhere 
to this standard. Su Katherine S. Mangan, Harvard Medical Sehool WiUK.up lts Conjliet-oflntmst 
Policies, CHRON. HIGHER Eouc.,J une 9, 2000, at A36; Richard A. Knox, Harvard Won't Ease Rueareh 
Standards: Medical School Stands f!J Conflict RN/es, BOSTON GLOBE, May 26, 2000, at A 1 .  Moreover, 
Harvard is demonstrating caution in its dealing.; with Merck & Co., which was the fin;t major drug 
company to establish a facility at Boston's Longwood Medical Area. Set Liz Kowalczyk, Harvard 
To Use Ca11tion tvith Mmle: Dean S '!JS Med'S chool Won 'I P11rs11e a Major Lian.ring Pact tvith Firm, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Aug. 1 ,  2001 , at C 1 .  Harvard will pursue a series of technology-specific collaborations with 
Merck, rather than a broad, multimillion-dollar deal. See id. 
1 23. Ste Cho, sttpra note 12, at 2208. See gtnmzlg mpra Part JII. A. 
1 24. See sllj>ra note 1 1  (identifying relevant legislation). 
1 25. S 11 id Set also sllj>ra note 83 and accompanying text. , • 
1 26. S11 Objectivity in Research, 59 Fed. Reg. 33,242 Qune 28, 1994). 
1 27. S�egeneraJ& NIH RESPONSE, sllj>m note 21. 
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clinical trials, 128 but NIH has not forced prompt disclosure, such as industry 
sponsor disclosure to the IRBs, of academic collaborators. 129 
Through such enhanced standards backed by meaningful enforcement, the 
institutions engaged in clinical research will be compelled to finally implement 
meaningful accountability measures. Presumably, such measures would include 
administratively bridge grant management and technology trans fer, the 
appointment of compliance officers, and engagement in routine technology 
transfer self-audits. Such basic measures are essential to ensure that grant 
recipient researchers, their departments, and the institutions themselves are 
avoiding conflicts of interest and, to the extent that conflicts prove unavoidable, 
managing them responsibly. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The world around institutions engaged in clinical research has changed To 
one side, basic research has become focused on application, and industry and 
academia have fully integrated. To the other, clinical research and clinical care are 
converging and clinical research has become dominated by a global CRO 
industry. 
Conflicts of interest are institutional weeds. They take root below the surface 
and become pervasive problems often long before they show their ugliness. In 
health care, that ugliness includes incidents such as the death of gene therapy 
patient Jesse Gelsinger,130 as well as the recent law suit by Immune Response 
against researchers at Harvard and the University of Califomia.131 
Public confidence in clinical trials is very high, evidenced by the demand for 
information about and access to trials, and general willingness to participate. 
That trust must not be lost. Rather, we .�must recognize that the role of 
institutions has changed and implement needed federal oversight changes so that 
we can embrace the benefits of the change, maintain the public's trust in health 
science, and move forward with the mission of improving human health. 
1 28. Stuupra note 1 1 4. 
1 29. Ste DHHS Press Release s.rpra note 1 1 2. 
1 30. Stt supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
1 3 1 .  Seuupra note 41 and accompanying text. 
